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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) provides the Utah Supreme 
Court jurisdiction to decide this appeal. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in granting a Rule 12(b) (6) 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs1 amended complaint? 
2. Did the lower court err in not following the mandate 
of the Utah Court of Appeals? 
3. Did the lower court commit reversible error by 
failing to allow a reasonable time for discovery, as directed in 
the mandate of the Lw.h Court of Appeals, prior to graining 
defendant's motion to dismiss? 
Each of the above issues is a question of law with no 
deference to the trial court. Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 
398 P.2d 207 (1965); Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., Inc., 590 
P.2d 1261 (Utah 1979); King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 
Utah 2d 399, 374 P.2d 254 (1962); see generally, Corbett v. 
Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985). 
A motion to dismiss is appropriate only when it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief 
under any statement of facts which could be proved in support of 
1 
his claim. E.g., Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First National 
Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988). 
An express ruling by an appellate court on issues raised 
in the appeal is the law of the case and is binding on the lower 
court and the parties. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
St. Paul Insurance Co.. 22 Utah 2d 70, 448 P.2d 724 (1968). 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order granting Valley Mortgage 
Company's (hereinafter "Valley Mortgage") motion to dismiss the 
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The case involves numerous parties. The lower court, pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, certified the order of 
dismissal for appeal. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A motion to dismiss is only appropriate when it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under 
any statement of facts which can be proved in support of its claim. 
E.g., Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First National Bank, supra. 
The complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and all reasonable inferences are construed in favor of 
2 
the plaintiff. Arrow Industries, supra, at 396; Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Barrus v. 
Wilkinson, supra at 208; Baur v. Pacific Finance Corp., 14 Utah 2d 
283, 383 P.2d 397 (1963). Applying the foregoing criteria, the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review, as alleged in 
the complaint, are as follows: 
1. The appellants, Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry (the 
"DeBrys") purchased a newly constructed office building located at 
4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 563, 576, 587, 
1258-59, 1425.) 
2. The building was purchased from Del Bartel and Dale 
Thurgood dba Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade"). Cascade constructed 
the building. (See, R. 9435-38.) 
3. The building contains numerous construction defects. 
Construction of the building also violated Salt Lake County's 
Building Code. Specifically, the building was constructed without 
county approved building plans, without a building permit and 
without numerous code required inspections having been performed. 
As a result of the construction defects and code violations, the 
building could not be legally occupied until approximately four 
years after the Debrys purchased the building. (See, R. 9439-54.) 
4. Prior to the purchase, Valley Mortgage and Cascade 
entered into a construction lending agreement. Valley Mortgage 
3 
agreed to loan $300,000 to Cascade to construct the building. (R. 
9506, para. 252.) 
5. Pursuant to the agreement, Valley Mortgage undertook 
the following obligations, all of which are standard obligations in 
the construction lending industry: 
a) Valley Mortgage was to assure that Cascade had a 
building permit, county approved plans and proper 
zoning,. The person assigned this task was 
Assistant Vice President Paul Thurston. 
b) Valley Mortgage was to inspect the building every 
three months to assure the building would be 
complete, of acceptable workmanship, and ready for 
occupancy. 
c) Valley Mortgage would control disbursement of any 
construction funds. 
Id. 
6. To assure a source of repayment, Valley Mortgage 
required Cascade to obtain lease commitments. Id. at para. 253. 
7. To secure an additional source of repayment for the 
construction loan, Valley Mortgage sought and obtained a long term 
financing commitment from Beneficial Life Insurance Co. ("Benefic-
ial Life"). As part of its agreement with Beneficial Life, Valley 
4 
Mortgage agreed to perform the following construction duties 
normally performed by construction lenders: 
a) Require completion of the building in compliance 
with the county building and zoning codes; 
b) Obtain a valid permanent certificate of occupancy; 
c) Obtain lease commitments or other sources of 
payment for the long term financing. 
(R. 9507, para. 254.) 
8. Because of its status as a construction lender and 
its contractual obligations to Beneficial Life and Cascade, Valley 
Mortgage was in a superior position to know and undertake to deter-
mine the building's status, defects and code violations. Valley 
Mortg :re knew or should have known: 
a) The nature, number and extent of the construction 
defects; 
b) The building's numerous code violations; 
c) That the building was incomplete, hazardous and not 
ready for occupancy. 
Id. at para. 255-56. 
9. Valley Mortgage's construction loan became due on 
February 1, 1985. Valley Mortgage extended the loan to March of 
1985. Subsequently, the lease commitments obtained by Cascade 
expired. However, when Cascade presented copies of earnest money 
5 
agreements signed by the DeBrys as purchasers, Valley Mortgage 
extended the loan to July 1, 1985• Id. at para. 257-58. 
10. In August of 1985, Valley Mortgage effectively took 
over the project by paying contractors directly. This is a 
practice which commonly occurs among construction lenders when a 
building is not complete and there are insufficient funds left to 
complete the building. Id. at para. 259-60. 
11. Valley Mortgage extended the loan once more to 
October 12, 1985. By this time, Valley Mortgage's long term loan 
agreement with Beneficial Life had collapsed. The only source of 
funds to repay Valley Mortgage's construction loan was a proposed 
sale to the DeBrys. All of these facts were known by Valley 
Mortgage. Id. 
12. Valley Mortgage granted another extension of the 
loan to December 12, 1985. At this point, the building was not 
complete and could not be occupied. Furthermore, Valley Mortgage 
knew there were not sufficient construction funds to complete the 
building and cure the building's defects. Id. at para. 2 61. 
13. The DeBrys were aware that Valley Mortgage was the 
construction lender on the building and relied upon Valley Mortgage 
to perform the duties that are customary to construction lenders, 
i.e., to periodically inspect the building, to assure that the 
construction proceeded from county approved plans and a building 
6 
permit, and not to disburse funds unless the building is timely and 
satisfactorily constructed in conformance with the building plans. 
Id. at 262. 
14. Valley Mortgage knew, or should have known, that the 
DeBrys were relying on it to perform the common duties of a 
construction lender and that the DeBrys would not purchase the 
building if they knew that Valley Mortgage had not performed its 
duties. Id. at 263. 
15. Valley Mortgage failed to disclose to the DeBrys 
that there was no building permit, no approved plans nor had there 
been adequate construction inspections. Valley Mortgage failed to 
disclose the construction defects and code violations. Valley 
Mortgage also failed to disclose that it had not performed normal 
construction lender functions. Id. at 264-65. 
16. Valley Mortgage concealed the foregoing from, the 
DeBrys because: 
a) It had lost its lease commitments; 
b) It had lost its long term financing commitment from 
Beneficial Life; 
c) The DeBrys were the sole source of funds that 
Valley Mortgage was looking to to pay off its con-
struction loan. Valley Mortgage knew that if the 
defects and code violations were ever disclosed to 
7 
the DeBrys, they would not complete the building 
purchase transaction; 
d) Valley Mortgage knew that the building was not 
complete and could not be occupied. Valley 
Mortgage knew that a foreclosure proceeding would 
not generate sufficient funds to repay the 
construction loan. It knew that Cascade could not 
repay the loan. 
Id. at 265. 
17. By failing to disclose existing defects and code 
violations to the DeBrys prior to the closing of the building sale 
transaction and by acting as a construction lender, Valley Mortgage 
negligently represented to the DeBrys: a) the county had issued a 
building permit; b) the building was constructed according to 
county approved plans; and c) the building was complete and 
inhabitable. All of these representations were false. 
18. Relying upon the above misrepresentations of Valley 
Mortgage, the DeBrys purchased the defective and hazardous 
building. The DeBrys were severely damaged. The cost of repair of 
building code defects is $3 3 3,515. Salt Lake County required the 
DeBrys to vacate the building for a period of time from early 1987 
to late 1989. The cost of alternate space was $351,604. 
8 
19. The DeBrys, known by Valley Mortgage as prospective 
purchasers, are in the class of persons foreseeably injured by 
Valley Mortgage's negligence. (R. 9405-15.) 
20. The DeBrys sued Valley Mortgage for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation and for negligence. Id. 
21. Early on in this litigation, the lower court granted 
Valley Mortgage's motion to dismiss the complaint. The DeBrys 
appealed. 
22. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the decision of 
the lower court. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., No. 880225CA (Utah 
App. June 19, 1989) (copy attached in Appendix). Specifically, the 
Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the DeBrys could seek redress 
under theories of lender liability (negligence), fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation. The court acknowledged that these 
causes of action are fact sensitive and instructed the lower c:urt 
not to consider a dismissal of the complaint until discovery 
fleshed out the relevant facts. The case was remanded with leave 
to amend the complaint. 
23. The court of appeals, in its opinion, cited Connor 
v. Great Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 
P. 2d 609 (1968) as the standard under which a claim for lender 
liability should be measured. £d. at 4. 
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24. On remand, appellants amended the complaint. The 
amended complaint alleged the three claims against Valley Mortgage, 
recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. 9405-15.) 
25. Contrary to the ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
the lower court failed to allow complete discovery and hastily 
dismissed the complaint for the second time. The trial court held: 
a) The DeBrys have not represented in argument or 
memorandum that Valley Mortgage intentionally 
misrepresented anything; 
b) The DeBrys have not represented that Valley 
Mortgage engaged in any type of behavior or conduct 
similar to that in Connor v. Great Western Savings 
and Loan Ass'n, supra; and 
c) That Connor "is a California case and has not been 
adopted by the State of Utah." 
(See, Findings and Order of Dismissal of Valley 
Mortgage Co.; R. 10932 at 35.) 
The lower court certified the case for appeal and the DeBrys timely 
appealed. 
10 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In the first appeal of this case, the Utah Court of 
Appeals reviewed an order of dismissal and ruled that the DeBrys 
could state a claim for relief under theories of fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation and lender liability (negligence). The court of 
appeals instructed tl ower ^ rt not to consider disposition of 
the case "unt adec * discovery has fleshed out the relevant 
facts." DeBi /. Vaiiey Mortgage Co., supra, at 4-5 (hereinafter 
"Valley"). 
On remand, the DeBrys amended the complaint to plead each 
of the three claims recognized by the court of appeals. However, 
instead of following the mandate and instructions of the court of 
appeals, the lower court refused to allow completion of discovery 
and entered a second order of dismissal. The court's failure to 
follow the mandate and instructions of the court of appeals is 
reversible error. See, e.g., Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 709 P. 2d 384 
(Utah 1985). 
11 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING 
A COMPLAINT THAT PLEADS THREE CLAIMS FOR RELIEF—ALL 
ACCEPTED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In Valley, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that Valley 
Mortgage, depending upon a fact finder's view of the evidence, may 
be liable to the DeBrys under theories of fraud, negligent misrep-
resentation and lender liability (negligence). Subsequently, the 
DeBrys plead each of these claims. The court of appeals recognized 
that each of these claims relied heavily upon the fact finder's 
determination. Instead of allowing a complete development of the 
pertinent fcicts through discovery, as suggested by the court of 
appeals, the trial court ruled that the complaint setting forth 
these three claims did not state a cause of action. This 
constituted reversible error. E.g., Arrow Industries, Inc. v. 
Zions First National Bank, supra. 
POINT III 
PRIVITY IS NOT A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF A 
MISREPRESENTATION OR NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
Apparently, one of the bases for the trial court's 
granting of the U.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss was the lack of 
contractual privity between the DeBrys and Valley Mortgage. 
However, privity is not required in a misrepresentation claim. 
E.g., Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962); Price-
12 
Orem Investment Co, v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 
55 (Utah 1986)• Nor is privity required in a negligence case. 
DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983). 
POINT IV 
IF THE COMPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE — IT SHOULD BE 
AMENDED — NOT DISMISSED 
If the complaint contains some as yet undefined factual 
omissions, the lower court should not have dismissed the complaint. 
Instead, the lower court should have allowed the DeBrys to amend 
their complaint. E.g., Lynn v. Valentine, 19 F.R.D. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956). 
POINT V 
DISMISSAL IS PREMATURE 
Utah law does not favor the granting of dispositive 
motions until discovery is complete. E.g., Downtown Athletic Club 
v. Hormanf 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). In this case, the Utah 
Court of Appeals instructed the lower court not to consider any 
dispositive motion until discovery fleshed out the facts. The 
lower court disregarded the instructions and granted the motion to 
dismiss prior to completion of discovery. This is reversible error. 
E.g. , Drake v. Morris Plan Co. of Californiaf 53 Cal.App.3d 208, 
125 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1975). 
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IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
A. Procedural Background. 
This is the second appeal to consider whether the DeBrys 
would be entitled to relief under any statement of facts which 
could be proved in support of their claim. In DeBry v. Valley 
Mortgage Co. , supra (the first appeal), the issue presented was 
whether Valley Mortgage's motion to dismiss should be upheld. The 
Utah Court of Appeals, held that it should not. The court stated: 
It would be inappropriate for this court to 
rule that in no circumstances and under no set 
of facts could Valley Mortgage, as a construc-
tion lender, be held liable to DeBrys as sub-
sequent purchasers of a project financed by 
Valley Mortgage. Based on the foregoing, we 
reverse the trial court's judgment and grant 
the DeBrys leave to amend their complaint. Id. 
at 5. 
In so ruling, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized three 
possible claims and instructed the lower court not to consider 
disposition of those claims until adequate discovery disclosed all 
relevant facts: 
In their amended complaint, DeBrys should set 
forth with particularity each cause of action 
in which they seek redress, i.e., lender 
liability under Connor v. Great Western Sav-
ings and Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3 69, 447 
14 
P.2d 609 (1968) fraud, and negligent misrep-
resentation. These causes of action are fact 
sensitive, and therefore, proper disposition 
may not be determined until adequate discovery 
has fleshed out the relevant facts. Id. at 4-
5. (Emphasis added.) 
On remand, the DeBrys carefully plead each of the three 
causes of action accepted by the Utah Court of Appeals. Incred-
ibly, Valley Mortgage responded with another motion to dismiss. 
Instead of allowing complete discovery to flesh out the facts, as 
instructed by the Utah Court of Appeals, the trial court gave only 
limited discovery prior to ruling on the motion. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
An express ruling by an appellate court on issues raised 
in the appeal is the law of the case and binding upon the parties, 
the trial court and any subsequent appellate court. Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. St. Paul Insurance Co., supra; 
Corbett v. Fitzgerald, supra; C & J Industries, Inc. v. Bailey, 669 
P.2d 855 (Utah 1983); Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 107, 
363 P.2d 498 (1961). 
When a case is reversed and remanded with specific 
instructions, the lower court is bound to follow the instructions. 
Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979). 
In summary, the Utah Court of Appeals in Valley speci-
fically held there are three possible claims against Valley 
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Mortgage. The DeBrys subsequently plead the three claims. How-
ever, the trial court blatantly disregarded the ruling and the 
instruction of the Utah Court of Appeals. The trial court refused 
to recognize a cause of action specifically recognized by the court 
of appeals (the Connor case, lender liability) and refused to allow 
complete discovery prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss. The 
trial court's failure to follow the mandate of the Utah Court of 
Appeals is reversible* error. Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. 
Mills, supra. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING 
A COMPLAINT THAT PLEADS THREE CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
ALL ACCEPTED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
A. Procedural Background. 
Without limiting the theories the DeBrys could plead 
against Valley Mortgage, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically 
approved three possible claims under which Valley Mortgage might be 
found liable to the DeBrys. They are fraud, negligent misrep-
resentation and lender liability. On remand, the DeBrys amended 
their complaint to allege the three claims accepted by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. The trial court, instead of focusing on the 
complaint to* determine whether it pleads any claims, attempted to 
resolve the facts plead by plaintiffs and erroneously reasoned that 
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oral argument didn't reveal sufficient facts to state a claim. (R. 
10934-35.) Further, the trial court held that the Connor v. Great 
Western Savings and Loan Ass'n case was not the law in Utah. Id. 
The Court of Appeals had specifically referred to the Connor case 
as one under which plaintiffs could state a claim. Valley at 4. 
The court then dismissed the complaint. As set forth in Point I, 
the trial court refused to follow the mandate of the court of 
appeals. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
1. Introduction. 
A motion to dismiss is only justified if it appears to a 
certainty that a plaintiff cannot be entitled to relief under any 
statement of facts which can be proven in support of its claim. 
Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First National Bank, supra; 
Freegard v. First Western National Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 
1987) . Further, the complaint must be construed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff and the trial court must indulge all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Arrow Industries, 
Inc. v. Zions First National Bank, supra; Penrod v. Nu Creation 
Creme, Inc., supra; Barrus v. Wilkinson, supra; Baur v. Pacific 
Finance Corp., supra. The complaint in this case, states a claim 
for fraud, a claim for negligent misrepresentation and a claim for 
lender liability. 
17 
2. The complaint states a claim for fraud. 
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the 
multifarious means which human ingenuity can 
devise and are resorted to in order to gain an 
advantage over another. . . . [I]t comprises 
all acts, omissions and concealments involving 
a breach of legal or equitable duty and 
resulting damage to another. Schwartz v. 
Tanner. 576 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1978). (Empha-
sis added.) 
The elements of fraud are: 1) a false representation of 
an existing material fact; 2) made knowingly or recklessly and 
inducing reliance; and 3) reliance thereon to the innocent party's 
detriment. Id. Each of the foregoing elements was properly 
alleged. These allegations create a question of fact precluding a 
motion to dismiss. Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 
P.2d 798 (Utah 1980); Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 
P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976); Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981). 
A claim for fraud may rest upon either intentional 
misrepresentation or concealment of information. Sucrarhouse 
Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 73 (Utah 1980); Elder v. 
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963). 
In the lower court, the only element Valley Mortgage said 
was lacking was a duty to speak. Whether a duty to speak exists, 
cannot be determined by merely looking at the pleadings. A duty to 
speak cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss. Whether a duty 
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to speak exists is determined by the fact finder based upon 
consideration of all the factual circumstances of the case. 
[E]xcept in broad terms the law does not 
attempt to define the occasions when a duty to 
speak arises. On the contrary, there has been 
adopted, as a leading principle, the proposi-
tion that whether a duty to speak exists is 
determinable by referring to all the circum-
stances of the case and by comparing the facts 
not disclosed with the object and end in view 
by the contracting parties. Clawson, 384 P.2d 
at 804. 
[T]he duty [to speak] arises from a relation 
of trust, from confidence, inequality of 
condition and knowledge or other attendant 
circumstances. . . . (Emphasis added.) Id. 
Knowledge that the other party to a contem-
plated transaction is acting under a mistaken 
belief as to certain facts is a factor in 
determini. -* that a duty of disclosure is 
owing. 384 P.2d at 805. 
Because the lower court granted the motion to dismiss, 
the fact finder cannot "refer to all the circumstances" nor compare 
facts with expectations and come to a decision on the fraud issue. 
The complaint alleges numerous duties requiring Valley Mortgage to 
speak. On a motion to dismiss, these allegations are accepted as 
true. Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First National Bank, supra. 
The allegations of the complaint satisfy the Clawson test and thus 
state a cause of action. As a construction lender, Valley Mortgage 
had knowledge of the building's condition superior to that of the 
DeBrys. It knew that the DeBrys were acting under the mistaken 
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belief that the building was habitable. Such allegations create a 
fact question as to whether Valley Mortgage had a duty to speak. 
Valley Mortgage's duty to speak also springs from the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 529. The restatement section provides: 
Representation misleading because incomplete. 
The representation stating the truth so far as 
it goes which the maker knows or believes to 
be materially misleading because of his fail-
ure to state additional or qualifying matter 
is a fraudulent misrepresentation. . . . 
By acting as a construction lender, Valley Mortgage 
represented that the builder was acting in compliance with state 
and county laws and regulations and had provided the bank with 
county approved plans. However, Valley Mortgage knew that such was 
not the case. The bank also knew that the DeBrys erroneously 
believed that such was the case. Thus, another fact question is 
presented as to whether the bank had a duty to speak. 
In addition, a vendor of real property "is under a duty 
to disclose to the vendee any concealed conditions, known to him, 
which involve unreasonable danger to the health and safety of those 
upon the premises and which the vendor may anticipate the vendee 
may not discover." Kimberlin v. Leer. 500 P. 2d 1022, 1023-24 (Nev. 
1972). In this case, Valley Mortgage effectively took over the 
project and stepped into the shoes of the vendor. Having stepped 
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into the shoes of a vendor, it had a duty to speak as a vendor and 
disclose the defects and code violations to the DeBrys. 
Valley Mortgage also had an affirmative duty to speak 
because of the dangerous and illegal nature of the building. 
Richfield Bank and Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 244 N.W.2d 
648, 652 (1976). Where one party has knowledge that physical harm 
might occur to another party, a duty to speak arises. Or, stated 
in other words, Valley Mortgage cannot silently stand by where 
people may be injured. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976). 
Finally, Valley Mortgage had a duty to speak because the 
complaint alleges that Valley Mortgage participated in a fraudulent 
scheme. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
For harm resulting to a third person from the 
tortious conduct of another, one is subject to 
liability if he . . . (b) knows that the 
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty 
and gives substantial assistance or encourage-
ment to the other to so conduct himself. . . . 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876. 
The DeBrys allege that the builder fraudulently con-
structed and sold a defective building. (R. 591-600, 1263-1275, 
1429-1443). The DeBrys also allege that Valley Mortgage knew or 
should have known the builder defendants did not have approved 
plans, a building permit, and that the said defendants constructed 
a defective building. (R. 607, 1284, 1451, 1452.) The DeBrys 
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further allege that after the construction loan became delinquent, 
Valley Mortgage concealed the defects and code violations to 
encourage the closing of the sale and thereby avoid having to 
foreclose the delinquent loan. Id. 
In Jeminson v. Montgomery Real Estate and Co., 396 Mich. 
106, 240 N.W.2d 205 (1976), the Michigan Supreme Court denied the 
lender's motion for summary judgment and allowed the purchaser to 
attempt to prove that the lender was part of a scheme to defraud. 
See also, Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.Supp. 396 (N.D. 111. 1977) (a 
lender may be liable as an aidor or abettor to a fraudulent 
scheme). This Court should remand for a trial to allow the DeBrys 
to prove Valley Mortgage's involvement in a fraudulent scheme. 
3. The complaint alleges a claim for negligent misrepresen-
tation. 
Utah recognizes a claim for making a statement without 
using reasonable diligence to determine its accuracy. This is 
known as negligent misrepresentation. Christensen v. Commonwealth 
Land Title Insurance Co. , 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983); Jardine v. 
Brunswick Corp. , 18 Utah 2d 378, 381, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967); 
see. Research Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d 1130, 1132 
(Utah 1984). 
The elements of negligent misrepresentation are: (1) a 
pecuniary interest in a transaction; (2) a superior position to 
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know material facts; (3) a careless or negligent false representa-
tion; (4) reasonable reliance; and (5) damage. Jardine v. Bruns-
wick Corp. 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967); Ellis v. Hale, supra. 
In the lower court, Valley Mortgage said it could not be 
liable for negligent misrepresentation because it did not misrep-
resent anything to the DeBrys and because there is no contractual 
or fiduciary relationship between the DeBrys and Valley Mortgage. 
However, whether there is a misrepresentation is a question of 
fact. On a motion to dismiss, all fact questions are resolved in 
favor of plaintiff. The allegations are accepted as true. 
Further, Valley Mortgage, in making the construction 
loan, necessarily represented that the builder was a licensed 
contractor constructing a building that complied with state and 
county laws. By concealing the building defects and code 
violations, Valley Mortgage misrepresented the building's condition 
to the DeBrys. 
In addition, liability for a negligent misrepresentation 
is not dependent upon a contractual or fiduciary relationship 
between the plaintiff and the person making the representation. 
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). It doesn't matter 
whether Valley Mortgage had a contractual or fiduciary relationship 
with the DeBrys. Liability arises when the defendant is in the 
business of knowing information or when it has a pecuniary interest 
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in the transaction. .Id. In the present case, both elements are 
present. Valley Mortgage had a pecuniary interest in the sale of 
the building because its loan was to be repaid from the proceeds of 
the sale. Further, Valley Mortgage, as a construction lender, is 
in the business of knowing the construction process. For both of 
these reasons, Valley Mortgage had a duty to disclose the code 
violations and the building defects to the DeBrys. Its failure to 
do so was a negligent misrepresentation of the building. 
4. The complaint sets forth a claim for lender liability 
negligence. 
The DeBrys' amended complaint set forth a claim for 
negligent lender liability based upon the case of Connor v. Great 
Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, supra. The court of appeals 
referred in its opinion to the Connor case as the standard for 
pleading a negligent lender liability case. DeBrv v. Valley 
Mortgage Co. , supra at 4. A motion to dismiss is almost never 
granted in ci negligence case because of the factual questions 
involved in a negligence claim. E.g., Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); FMA Acceptance Co. v. 
Leatherby Insurance Co. , 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). The facts pled 
in this case clearly state a claim for negligence. 
The construction loan process does not occur in a vacuum 
with only th€> presence* of the lender and the owner/borrower. Other 
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third parties include: (1) the general contractor; (2) subcontrac-
tors; (3) suppliers of materials; (4) the permanent financing 
lender; and (5) the purchaser. Further, because construction 
lending presents far greater risks than lending on a completed 
structure, construction lenders become intimately involved in the 
construction process. G.S. Nelson, D.A. Whitman, REAL ESTATE 
FINANCE LAW pp. 827-28 (2d. ed. 1985) (hereinafter "Whitman"). For 
all practical purposes, the lender owns the building and controls 
the project. 
To assure repayment of the construction loan, Valley 
Mortgage, as a construction lender, should have controlled the 
construction by: 
1. Assuming a duty to inspect the construction. 
Whitman, supra at 828. 
2. Requiring marketing studies. Whitman, supra 
at 831. 
3. Reviewing plans and specifications to make sure 
that the building complied with local codes. Id. 
4. Controlling disbursements by use of the voucher 
system. The voucher system requires the lender to 
disburse funds only when it is presented with bills 
or vouchers for work actually done on the site. 
Whitman, supra at 833. 
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5. Requiring a performance bond. Whitman, supra at 
837. 
6. Drafting numerous conditions in its loan commitment 
to the borrower. Whitman, supra at 846. 
In addition, Valley Mortgage effectively became the 
vendor of the property. Valley Mortgage obtained, but then lost, 
long term financing to repay its loan. The DeBrys1 earnest money 
offer was presented to Valley Mortgage and became the hope of the 
bank to repay the construction loan. Valley Mortgage began paying 
the contractors directly. Finally, Valley Mortgage repeatedly 
extended the construction loan to assure that the DeBrys purchased 
the property. In summary, Valley Mortgage participated in and 
controlled every aspe>ct of the purchase transaction. 
When construction lenders control the transaction, they 
are held liable to other third-parties who are either intentionally 
or negligently mislead by the lender. 
For example, to protect third-party laborers or suppliers 
of materials, the courts create equitable liens on the land or on 
undisbursed construction loan proceeds. These liens are created 
under theories of either unjust enrichment or third party 
beneficiary contract. E.g., S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. East Harlem 
Pilot Block, 608 F.2d 28, 35 (2nd Cir. 1979); Irwin Concrete, Inc. 
v. Sun Coast Properties, Inc., 33 Wash.App. 190, 653 P.2d 1331 
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(1982); In re: Monroe County Housing Corp., Inc., 18 B.R. 741 (S.D. 
Fla. 1982). In imposing the lien, the courts frequently focus on 
whether the construction lender misled the third-party claimant 
causing him to continue to furnish labor or materials. Chase 
Manhattan Bank v. S/D Enterprises, Inc., 353 So.2d 131 (Fla. App. 
1977) ; c.f., Hall's Misc. Ironworks, Inc. v. All Southern 
Investment Co. Inc., 283 So.2d 372 (Fla. App. 1973). 
The rationale for imposing the fictitious lien is that 
the third-party suppliers would not have invested the materials to 
the project if the suppliers were not misled by the construction 
lender. 
There is no logical reason why the law should protect the 
third-party supplier or laborer and not protect the third-party 
purchaser. Both the supplier and the purchaser are investing 
assets in the project. Both rely upon the representations of the 
lender. Neither would spend their assets on the project if they 
knew the true facts. 
The courts also protect third-party property owners 
against the negligent disbursement of funds by the construction 
lender. Cambridge Acceptance Corp. v. Hockstein, 102 N.J. Super. 
435, 246 A.2d 138 (1968). An example is Fikes v. First Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 533 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975). In Fikes, the 
plaintiff owned an unrecordable equitable interest in a piece of 
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property. Fikes claimed that the developers had diverted loan 
disbursements to other projects during the course of construction 
and did so with the lender's knowledge. The court recognized the 
validity of Fike's equitable interest. The central issue facing 
the court was whether a lender has a duty to protect the third-
party interests of which the lender has knowledge. Like Valley 
Mortgage, the lender in Fikes argued that no such duty existed 
because there was no privity of contract. The appellate court 
rejected the lenderfs contention and held that a duty existed. The 
court observed that when Fikes allowed the developer to take legal 
title to the property, he had a reasonable expectation that First 
Federal would perform its role as a construction lender in a 
conventional manner. If First Federal had disbursed the 
construction loan proceeds according to normal secured lending 
practices, the property which Fikes had contracted to buy would 
have been enhanced in value. By failing to follow ordinary 
disbursement procedures, First Federal breached its duty to Fikes. 
Similarly, when the DeBrys executed an earnest money 
agreement with the building owners/contractors, the DeBrys had the 
reasonable expectation that Valley Mortgage would perform its role 
as a construction lender in a conventional manner. The DeBrys had 
a reasonable expectcition that prior to dispursement of loan 
proceeds Valley Mortgage would: (1) require a building permit; (2) 
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review the building plans and specifications; (3) periodically 
inspect the building; and (4) require proof the work was completed. 
See Whitman, supra at 825-838. 
If Valley Mortgage had disbursed its construction loan 
proceeds in accordance with normal lending practices, the property 
which the DeBrys intended to buy would have been enhanced by an 
acceptable building. Had the bank carried out the inspections 
expected of it as a construction lender, it would have discovered 
the code violations and building defects. 
Finally, in Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan 
Ass'n. supra. the California Supreme Court specifically held that 
a construction lender may be liable to the purchasers for the 
negligent construction of a builder. 
In Connor, the California Supreme Court listed the 
following six factors to be examined in determining the extent of 
the duty imposed upon the lender. 
1. The extent to which the transaction was intended to 
affect plaintiff. 
2. The foreseeability of harm to him. 
3. The degree of certainty that plaintiff would suffer 
injury. 
4. The closeness of the connection between the 
defendant's conduct and the injuries suffered. 
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5. The moral blame attached to defendant's conduct. 
6. The policy of preventing future harm. 
Connor, at 617. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Valley, accepted Connor as 
stating the standard for a lender liability claim. Valley, supra at 
4. In the present case, no one knows how an extensive analysis of 
those six factors by a fact finder would turn out. Notwithstanding 
the court of appeals1 ruling, the lower court erroneously ruled, as 
a matter of law, that Connor is not the law in Utah and dismissed 
the claim based on negligent lender liability. 
The pleadings clearly show that the DeBrys stated a claim 
under Connor. Like Connor, the DeBrys are the purchasers of improv-
ed real estate. The transaction was intended to affect the DeBrys. 
Further, a copy of the DeBry's earnest money offer was given to 
Valley Mortgage. Valley Mortgage knew that the DeBry's were the 
prospective buyers of a defective building. This harm was clearly 
foreseeable to Valley Mortgage. Similarly, it was absolutely clear 
that the DeBrys would suffer injury. Valley Mortgage knew or 
should have known of the construction defects and code violations. 
It knew that the building could not be completed with available 
construction funds. 
In addition, there is a clear connection between Valley 
Mortgage's conduct and the injury suffered. There is also moral 
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blame. Valley Mortgage, by repeatedly extending the construction 
loan and concealing the defects effectively suckered the DeBrys 
into purchasing a defective building just so Valley Mortgage could 
be repaid and not harmed by its failure to act as a responsible 
construction lender. Finally, the policy of preventing further 
harm favors the DeBrys. 
In summary, the DeBrys1 complaint sets forth a claim for 
lender liability negligence because: 
a) Valley Mortgage mislead the DeBrys; 
b) Valley Mortgage did not properly disburse the 
construction funds; 
c) The complaint meets the criteria set forth in 
Connor, a theory accepted by the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
POINT III 
PRIVITY IS NOT A REQUIRED ELEMENT 
OF A MISREPRESENTATION OR NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
A. Procedural Background. 
In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Valley Mortgage 
argued that it could not be liable for its concealments and 
misrepresentations because there was no contractual privity between 
it and the DeBrys. (See generally R. 9655-69, 9755-62.) That is, 
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the DeBrys did not have a construction contract with Valley 
Mortgage, nor did they have an account with Valley Mortgage.1 
Similarly, Valley Mortgage also said that it could not be 
held liable for negligence to the DeBrys because there was no 
contractual privity between the DeBrys and Valley Mortgage. Id. 
However, contractual privity is not an element in a negligence or 
misrepresentation case. Thus, the decision of the lower court 
should be reversed. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
1. Privity of contract is not an element in a fraud case. 
Privity between the parties is not a required element in 
a fraud case. If a person fraudulently makes a misrepresentation 
to another, with the knowledge it will be transmitted to a third 
person, the third person has a cause of action for fraud. Ellis v. 
Hale, supra. 
2. Privity of contract is not an element in a negligent 
misrepresentation case. 
The tort of negligent misrepresentation is neither 
derived from nor dependent upon the DeBrys having contractual 
rights with Valley Mortgage: 
*The relationship of a depositor to a financial institution is 
a contractual one. 
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Utah long ago acknowledged the tort of 
negligent misrepresentation, which provides 
that a party injured by reasonable reliance 
upon a second party's careless or negligent 
misrepresentation of a material fact may 
recover damages resulting from that injury 
when the second party had a pecuniary interest 
in the transaction, was in a superior position 
to know the material facts, and should have 
reasonably foreseen that the injured party was 
likely to rely upon the fact. Privity of 
contract is not a necessary prerequisite to 
liability. Price-Orem Investment Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 
59 (Utah 1986). (Citations omitted). 
3. The DeBrys1 claim for negligence (lender liability) does 
not require privity of contract. 
Tort liability for negligence is not based upon any 
contractual relationship between the parties. 
As Professor Prosser has explained: "[Whereas] 
[c]ontract actions are created to protect the 
interest in having promises performed," 
"[t]ort actions are created to protect the 
interest in freedom from various kinds of 
harm. The duties of conduct which give rise 
to them are imposed by law and are based 
primarily upon social policy, and not 
necessarily upon the will or intention of the 
parties. . . . " DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 
663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983). 
The elements in a negligence case are the duty of 
reasonable care, breach of the duty, proximate causation (foresee-
ability), injury and damage. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1985). Privity of contract is not required. In their complaint, 
the DeBrys alleged each of the required elements. The DeBrys have 
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stated a claim for negligence. Therefore, it was reversible error 
for the lower court to dismiss the complaint. 
POINT IV 
IF THE COMPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE — IT SHOULD 
BE AMENDED — NOT DISMISSED 
Because a motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it 
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief under any statement of facts, e.g., Valley; Arrow Indus-
tries, supra, the court should not have dismissed the complaint if 
there is as yet some undefined factual omission. Plaintiffs' 
claims are, by their nature, fact sensitive. Valley, supra. If 
there is a fcictual omission in the pleading, the lower court should 
have identified the omission and allowed the DeBrys to amend their 
complaint. E.g., Lynn v. Valentine, 19 F.R.D. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
The trial court refused to do so. 
POINT V 
DISMISSAL IS PREMATURE 
A. Procedural Background. 
In Valley, the Utah Court of Appeals instructed the lower 
court not to consider disposition of the DeBrys1 complaint "until 
discovery has fleshed out the relevant facts." Valley, supra at 4-
5. 
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Upon filing of the amended complaint, Valley Mortgage 
promptly filed another Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The motion 
was set for hearing on January 11, 1990. The plaintiffs argued 
that the court of appeals had instructed the trial court to allow 
discovery to be completed before ruling on dispositive motions. 
The court, over objection, set a hearing date on the motion to 
dismiss for March 21, 1990 and stated discovery could proceed in 
the interim. Plaintiff was able to complete one deposition, but 
complete discovery was not possible. At the hearing on March 21, 
1991, the lower court granted the motion to dismiss. The only 
discovery that occurred was the taking of the one deposition. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
Utah law does not favor granting dispositive motions 
until discovery is complete since discovery may create issues 
requiring a trial. E.g., Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 
P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). Specifically, claims for negligence and 
misrepresentation should not be disposed of until after discovery 
is complete. To prematurely dismiss such claims is reversible 
error. Drake v. Morris Plan Co. of California, 53 Cal.App.3d 208, 
125 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670 (1975); Fikes v. First Federal Savings & 
Loan Ass'n, supra; Christiansen v. Philcent Corp., 226 Pa.Super. 
157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973). To dismiss the claims in this case prior 
35 
to completion of discovery was a violation of the order of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
The law of the case, as set forth in the opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, is that Connor states the law to be applied 
in Utah on the issue of lender liability. The trial court's ruling 
that Connor is not the law in Utah is plain error requiring 
reversal. 
Construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, and 
construing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, the 
amended complaint states three causes of action against Valley 
Mortgage. The order of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs' 
complaint must be reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings in the trial court. 
DATED this (f*U day of February, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellants 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
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Robert J. Debry and Joan 
Debry, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Valley Mortgage Company, 
et al., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880255-CA 
F I L E D 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
. .Mte f. Noor*n 
Cierio&f *>• Court 
Dart Court o( Appsirfs 
Attorneys: Dale F. Gardiner and Robert J. Debry, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Roy G. Haslam and Thomas R. Grisley, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The trial court granted respondent Valley Mortgage 
Company's ("Valley Mortgage") motion to dismiss appellant 
Robert J. and Joan Debrys' ("Debrys") complaint, under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. Debrys appeal from this decision 
claiming the trial court should have allowed them to amend 
their complaint to cure any defects or, in the alternative, the 
complaint adequately stated a claim for relief. 
FACTS 
We recite the facts as alleged in Debrys1 complaint. 
Debrys purchased a newly constructed office building located at 
4252 South 700 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, from the builder, 
Cascade Enterprises ("builder"). Valley Mortgage was the 
construction lender on the building and secured its loan 
through a deed of trust. When the building was sold to Debrys, 
the builder repaid Valley Mortgage from the sale proceeds. 
F!LE COPY 
After the sale, Debrys claimed to have discovered serious 
construction defects in the office building. Debrys claimed 
they would not have purchased the building had they known about 
the defects. As a result/ Debrys filed a complaint naming 
nineteen defendants including Valley Mortgage. Debrys' 
complaint stated the following claim against Valley Mortgage: 
In connection with [Valley Mortgage's] 
activities as a construction lender, 
[Valley Mortgage] was aware, or should 
have been aware, that no valid building 
permit was obtained for the building. 
Furthermore, [Valley Mortgage] knew, or 
should have known, that the required 
inspections were not conducted on the 
building by County officials. 
[Valley Mortgage] had a duty to disclose 
the true facts to plaintiffs. [Valley 
Mortgage] failed to disclose the true 
facts to plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs allege on information and 
belief that [Valley Mortgage] failed to 
disclose the true facts to plaintiffs 
because the construction loan was 
delinquent and [Valley Mortgage] wanted to 
avoid the time, cost and risk of 
foreclosure proceedings. 
By reason of [Valley Mortgage's] conduct 
as alleged above, plaintiffs have 
purchased a building that is neither 
habitable nor marketable. If the contract 
between plaintiffs and Cascade Enterprises 
is.not rescinded, plaintiffs will be -
damaged in the amount of the cost "of the" 
building, plus improvements, plus 
interest. The exact amount of such damage 
is not yet known. 
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Valley Mortgage moved to dismiss the complaint under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. At oral argument on Valley Mortgage's 
motion and in response to contentions that Debrys had not 
stated their claim in sufficient detail, Debrys requested leave 
to amend their complaint to set forth their claims with greater 
particularity. Although the trial court had allowed Debrys to 
amend their complaint on two previous occasions in response to 
motions brought by other defendants, this was Debrys1 first 
request to amend their claim against Valley Mortgage. The 
trial court denied Debrys* request and granted Valley 
Mortgage's motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of its claim." Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). See also Freeoard v. 
First W. Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). "In 
reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, we are obliged 
to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its 
favor." Arrow Indus., 767 P.2d at 936. See also Penrod v. Nu 
Creation .Creme,, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Barrus v. 
Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (1965); Baur v. 
Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 283, 383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963). 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
Leave to amend a pleading is a matter within the broad 
discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb its 
determinations absent an abuse of discretion resulting in 
prejudice to the party. Chadwick v. Nielson, 763 P.2d 817, 820 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 
245, 247 (Utah 1983); Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation 
Qo^f 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983). In exercising its 
discretion, the trial court should consider a motion to amend 
"in light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in the 
interest of fairness and substantial justice." Girard, 660 
P.2d at 247. See also Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 
P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971). The rule in Utah is -to allow 
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amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is 
this true before trial.- Gillman, 486 P.2d at 1046. See also 
Tripp v. Vauohn, 746 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Moreover, a trial court "must have sufficient grounds to 
apply the 'harsh and permanent remedy* of a dismissal with 
prejudice." Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. 
Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(trial court abused its discretion in not allowing amendment or 
granting continuance so plaintiff could include indispensable 
parties). See also Bonneville Tower Condominium Management 
Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 
1986) (trial court should have dismissed without prejudice for 
plaintiffs' failure to join indispensable parties); Gillman, 
486 P.2d at 1046-47 (trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to allow defendant to amend its answer by filing a 
counterclaim). 
In the instant case, the trial court denied Debrys' oral 
motion to amend its complaint to allege with greater 
specificity its cause of action against Valley Mortgage. The 
court denied the motion and dismissed the claim against Valley 
Mortgage with prejudice. This ruling was particularly harsh 
because it was made in advance of trial where there was no 
evidence of prejudice or undue delay in allowing Debrys to 
amend its claim. Accordingly, we find the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the motion to amend. We reverse and 
remand so that Debrys may amend their complaint against Valley 
Mortgage. 
In their amended complaint, Debrys should set forth with 
particularity each cause of action in which they seek redress 
i.e., lender liability under Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968), fraud, and 
negligent misrepresentation. These causes of action are fact 
sensitive, and therefore, proper disposition may not be 
determined until adequate discovery has fleshed out the 
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relevant facts.1 See, e.g., Drake v. Morris Plan Co. of 
California, 53 Cal. App. 3d.208, 125 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670 
(1975); Fikes v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Anchorage, 
533 P.2d 251, 259-61 (Alaska 1975); Christiansen v. Philcent 
Corp., 226 Pa. Super. 157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973). 
It would be inappropriate for this court to rule that in no 
circumstances and under no set of facts could Valley Mortgage, 
as a construction lender, be held liable to Debrys as 
subsequent purchasers of a project financed by Valley 
Mortgage. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's 
judgment and grant^ihe.DQbrys' leave to amend their complaint. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE COIJjajR: 
Pamelajp. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. In so stating, we do not suggest that Debry and their 
counsel are free to make Valley Mortgage a defendant and hope 
to turn up a claim against them in the course of discovery. On 
the contrary, each claim in the amended pleading must be "well 
grounded in fact,M as revealed by "reasonable inquiry," as well 
as "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law . . . ." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11. 
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THOMAS R. GRISLEY (3802) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Valley Mortgage Company 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL; 
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL? 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.; 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a general 
partnership; LEE ALLEN BARTEL; 
SALMON & ALDER, INC.; WILLIAM 
TRIGGER dba TRIGGER ROOFING; 
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC, INC.; SCOTT 
MCDONALD REALTY, INC.; STANLEY 
POSTMA; TRI-K CONTRACTORS; KEN 
BAR MANUFACTURING COMPANY; 
GRANDEUR HOME BUILDERS 
COMPONENTS; SOTER KNUDSEN; VAN 
ELLSWORTH dba DRAFTING 
UNLIMITED; CANADA LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.; 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE CO.; MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY; 
AMERICAN ASPHALT PAVING; 
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY; J.F. 
SMITH dba SMITH & JOHNSON LAND 
& TITLE COMPANY; VALLEY 
MORTGAGE CO.; UNITED BANK; THE 
HARTFORD, CENTREX, INC.; AND 
ZIONS LEASING COMPANY, 
FINDINGS AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL OF VALLEY 
MORTGAGE COMPANY 
Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
DEL K. BARTEL and DALE THURGOOD, 
Third-Party, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES, 
HUISH & DEBRY, INC., DAVID M. 
JORGENSEN, BRADFORD DEBRY, 
STERLING GUSTAFSON, THOMPSON & 
SONS HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING 
COMPANY, INC., and JOHN DOES 
1 THROUGH 50, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
The motion to dismiss the causes of action set forth 
against Valley Mortgage Company in DeBrys1 Fourth Amended Com-
plaint came on for hearing on the 28th day of March, 1990 before 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Edward T. Wells, Robert DeBry & 
Associates, appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs, Robert Debry 
and Joan Debry, and Thomas R. Grisley, Parsons, Behle & Latimer, 
appeared on behalf of the defendant, Valley Mortgage Company. 
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
having reviewed the contents of the file, and otherwise being 
full advised under the premises, hereby makes the following 
findings and order: 
- 9 -
FINDINGS 
1. In their Fourth Amended Complaint, DeBrys have set 
forth three causes of action against Valley Mortgage. Debrys 
have alleged that Valley Mortgage: 
(a) Concealed facts (claim for concealment); 
(b) Misrepresented facts (negligent misrepresen-
tation; or 
(c) Intentionally engaged in behavior that 
resulted in a detriment to the DeBrys (lender liability). 
2. With regard to the cause of action for conceal-
ment, the Court finds that the Debrys have not represented, 
either in argument or in memorandum, that Valley Mortgage inten-
tionally misrepresented anything on which the DeBrys relied to 
their detriment, or that Valley Mortgage fraudulently engaged in 
any behavior which resulted in injury to the DeBrys. 
3. Under DeBrys' second cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation, the Court specifically finds that there has 
been no representation in argument, or upon facts set forth in 
memorandum to substantiate that Valley Mortgage owed a duty to 
the DeBrys. 
4. DeBrys1 third cause of action is based upon lender 
liability predicated under the theory espoused by the California 
court in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan, et al., 447 P.2d 
609 (Cal. 1968). 
-3-
5. This Court specifically finds that the DeBrys have 
not, and cannot, represent that Valley Mortgage engaged in any 
type of activity or behavior, or conduct that would suggest that 
the standards set forth in the Connor v. Great Western Savings & 
Loan case should apply in the case before the Court. 
6. The Court further finds that the Connor v. Great 
Western Savings & Loan case is a California case, and has not 
been adopted by the state of Utah. 
7. If the Connor case standard were applied, however, 
the Court specifically finds that there have been no representa-
tion or pleadings by the DeBrys that demonstrated that Valley 
Mortgage was anything other than a standard lending institution 
in the Cascade building project, and that the pleadings did not 
allege egregious, outrageous or commercially inappropriate 
behavior by Valley Mortgage in its involvement with the Cascade 
project. 
ORDER 
THEREFORE, based on the findings of the Court, all of 
which are predicated on the allegations set forth in DeBrys1 
Fourth Amended Complaint, arguments by counsel orally and in 
writing, and in the absence of any specific facts cited to the 
Court by DeBrys to support the pleadings, the Court grants Valley 
Mortgage's Motion to Dismiss all counts and allegations by the 
DeBrys as set forth in their Fourth Amended Complaint. 
ENTERED this f day of /v^V^/ 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT cbURT "JUDGE 
/£Z. 
•-Ii'-V J,. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF VALLEY MORTGAGE COMPANY to the following on 
thisc2£L_ day of maL. 1990: 
Edward T. Wells 
DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VALLEY MORTGAGE CO., 
Defendant. 
DEBRY, ; 
i ORDER CERTIFYING ORDER | GRANTING DISMISSAL OF | VALLEY BANK AS A FINAL | ORDER UNDER RULE 54(b) OF 
l THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
) PROCEDURE 
i Civil No. C86-553 
) JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
The court heretofore granted the Motion to Dismiss 
Valley Mortgage. Plaintiff then moved the court for an* order 
certifying the dismissal as a final judgment pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The matter was argued to the court on March 28, 1990, 
at 2:30 p.m. Thomas Grisley, Esq.f appeared as counsel for 
Valley Mortgage Co. and Edward T. Wells, Esq. appeared as counsel 
for plaintiffs. 
The parties having agreed that all rights of the said 
parties were adjudged by the granting of said dismissal; and both 
agreeing that Rule 54(b) certification was proper; and the court 
finding expressly that there is no just reason for delay; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
order granting dismissal of Valley Mortgage Co. signed by the 
court on May 7, 1989 be and hereby is designated as a final 
judgment between the said parties pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this j^ day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
J- c^L 
PAT B. BRIAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the O day of £u&*», 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER CERTIFYING ORDER GRANTING 
DISMISSAL OF VALLEY BANK AS A FINAL ORDER UNDER RULE 54(B) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was 
mailed, to the following: 
Thomas Grisley 
Roy G. Haslam 
185 South State #700 
SLC, UT 84111 
-TZuAtlfai 
rjd.vm/lk 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
VALLEY MORTGAGE CO., et al., 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil No. C86-553 
) JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Notice is hereby given that Robert J. DeBry and Joan 
DeBry, plaintiffs herein named, hereby appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah from the order of the District Court 
granting the motion of Valley Mortgage Co. to dismiss plaintiffs' 
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure entered herein on May 2, 1990 and certified by the 
District Court as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on May 2, 1990. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
of the foregoing 
mailed, on the 
I certify that a true and correct copy 
NOTICE OF APPEAL (DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was 
^JZ day of May, 1990, to the following: 
Robert Hughes 
50 West 300 South #1000 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del Bartel 
P.O. Box 7234 
Murray, UT 84107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Del Bartel 
P.O. Box 7234 
Murray, UT • 84107 
Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Lee Allen Bartel 
110 Merriraac Court 
Vallejo, CA 94589 
Glen Roberts 
2677 Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Stanley Postma 
257 1 South 7 5 West 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Lynn McMurray 
4 55 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 
SP3-694\jn 
#30 
84111 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Randall L. Skeen 
1245 East Brickyard Rd. #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Thomas Grisley 
Roy G. Haslam 
185 South State 
Salt Lake City, 
#700 
UT 84111 
D. Michael Nielsen 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Darwin C Hansen 
136 South Main, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Craig Peterson 
425 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Van Ellsworth 
1414 Laburnum Street 
McLean, VA 22101 
Ken Bartel 
12188 Clay 
Herald, CA 
Star Rd 
95638 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ; 
VALLEY MORTGAGE CO., et al., 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil No. C86-553 
) JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Notice is hereby given that Robert J. DeBry and Joan 
DeBry, plaintiffs herein named, hereby appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah from the order of the District Court 
granting the motion of Valley Mortgage Co. to dismiss plaintiffs' 
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure entered herein on May 1,. 1990 and certified by the 
District Court as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on May 7, 1990. 
DATED this S^ / day of May, 1990. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL (DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was mailed, on the 
/ day of-4s$f 1990, to the following: 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del Bartel 
P.O. Box 7234 
Murray, UT 84107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Del Bartel 
P.O. Box 7234 
Murray, UT• 84107 
Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Lee Allen Bartel 
110 Merrimac Court 
Vallejo, CA 94589 
Glen Roberts 
2677 Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Stanley Postma 
2571 South 75 West 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Lynn McMurray 
455 East 500 South #30 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SP3-694\jn 
Robert Hughes 
50 West 300 South #1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Randall L. Skeen 
1245 East Brickyard Rd. #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Thomas Grisley 
Roy G. Haslam 
185 South State 
Salt Lake City, 
#700 
UT 84111 
D. Michael Nielsen 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Darwin C. Hansen 
136 South Main, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Craig Peterson 
425 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Van Ellsworth 
1414 Laburnum Street 
McLean, VA 22101 
Ken Bartel 
12188 Clay Star Rd 
Herald, CA 95638 
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